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I. INTRODUCTION
Legal scholars and social scientists from a range of disciplines have
converged on a question that legal realists posed long ago: Does the
actual practice of judging differ from the traditional account of judicial
decision-making and if so, then how?1  To examine this question,
© Copyright held by the NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW.
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1. See FELIX S. COHEN, ETHICAL SYSTEMS AND LEGAL IDEALS: AN ESSAY ON THE
FOUNDATIONS OF LEGAL CRITICISM (1933); JEROME FRANK, LAW AND THE MODERN
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large-scale qualitative and quantitative studies have flourished.2
From the field of political science, we are discerning that, while prece-
dent constrains judging, political ideology subtly influences judicial
behavior in a number of contexts.3  From the field of law and psychol-
ogy, we are uncovering that cognitive biases, preconceptions, and
prejudice lead reasoning and judgment to depart from normative theo-
ries of rationality.4  We are actively investigating the heuristics that
judges employ, their cognitive biases, and the potential shortcomings
of their judgment.  These research paradigms confirm the contempo-
MIND (1930); Joseph C. Hutcheson, Jr., The Judgment Intuitive: The Function of
the “Hunch” in Judicial Decision, 14 CORNELL L.Q. 274 (1929); Karl Llewellyn, A
Realistic Jurisprudence-The Next Step, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 431, 444 (1930).
2. See, e.g., Lee Epstein et al., Why (and When) Judges Dissent: A Theoretical and
Empirical Analysis, 3 J. LEGAL ANALYSIS 101 (2011); Lee Epstein & Gary King,
The Rules of Inference, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (2002). See generally Stewart Macau-
lay, The New Versus the Old Legal Realism: “Things Ain’t What They Used To
Be,” 2005 WIS. L. REV. 365, 385–87 (2005); Thomas J. Miles & Cass R. Sunstein,
The New Legal Realism, 75 U. CHI. L. REV. 831, 831 (2008).
3. See, e.g., CORNELL CLAYTON & HOWARD GILLMAN, SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAK-
ING: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST APPROACHES 1 (1999); FRANK B. CROSS, DECISION-
MAKING IN THE U.S. COURT OF APPEALS 77 (2007); JEFFREY A. SEGAL & HAROLD J.
SPAETH, THE SUPREME COURT AND THE ATTITUDINAL MODEL (2003); HAROLD J.
SPAETH & JEFFREY A. SEGAL, MAJORITY RULE OR MINORITY WILL: ADHERENCE TO
PRECEDENT ON THE U.S. SUPREME COURT (1999); THE SUPREME COURT IN AMERI-
CAN POLITICS: NEW INSTITUTIONALIST INTERPRETATIONS (Cornell W. Clayton &
Howard Gilman eds., 1999); Frank Cross et al., Judicial Partisanship and Obedi-
ence to Legal Doctrine: Whistleblowing on the Federal Courts of Appeals, 107 YALE
L.J. 2155 (2004); Lee Epstein, Jack Knight & Andrew Martin, The Supreme
Court as a Strategic National Policy Maker, 50 EMORY L.J. 583 (2001); Howard
Gillman & Cornell W. Clayton, Beyond Judicial Attitudes: Institutional Ap-
proaches to Supreme Court Decision-Making, in SUPREME COURT DECISION-MAK-
ING: NEW INSTITUTIONAL APPROACHES 15, 20 (Cornell W. Clayton & Howard
Gillman eds., 1999); Cass R. Sunstein et al., Ideological Voting on Federal Courts
of Appeals: A Preliminary Investigation, 90 VA. L. Rev. 301 (2004).
4. See Chris Guthrie et al., Blinking on the Bench: How Judges Decide Cases, 93
CORNELL L. REV. 1 (2007); Chris Guthrie et al., Inside the Judicial Mind, 86 COR-
NELL L. REV. 777, 778 (2001) [hereinafter Guthrie, Inside the Judicial Mind]
(“[W]e found that each of the five illusions we tested had a significant impact on
judicial decision making.  Judges, it seems, are human.  Like the rest of us, their
judgment is affected by cognitive illusions that can produce systematic errors in
judgment.”); Stephen Landsman & Richard F. Rakos, A Preliminary Inquiry into
the Effect of Potentially Biasing Information on Judges and Juries in Civil Litiga-
tion, 12 BEHAV. SCI. & L. 113 (1994) (reporting results of experiment suggesting
that judges and jurors may be similarly influenced by exposure to potentially bi-
asing information); W. Kip Viscusi, How Do Judges Think About Risk?, 1 AM. L.
& ECON. REV. 26 (1999) (reporting results of a study of judges’ biases); Roselle L.
Wissler, Allen J. Hart & Michael J. Saks, Decisionmaking About General Dam-
ages: A Comparison of Jurors, Judges, and Lawyers, 98 MICH. L. REV. 751, 776,
786 (1999) (studying the factors that contribute to judges’ assessments of the se-
verity of injuries and judges’ awards for damages); Andrew J. Wistrich et al., Can
Judges Ignore Inadmissible Information? The Difficulty of Deliberately Disre-
garding, 153 U. PA. L. REV. 1251 (2005).
2012] JUDICIAL MINDSETS 613
rary relevance of Justice Holmes’s theory that judging is not merely a
deductive feat,5 that “[t]he felt necessities of the time, the prevalent
moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or un-
conscious, even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-
men, have had a good deal more to do [with legal reasoning] than the
syllogism. . . .”6
The law and psychology community has studied jury decision-mak-
ing extensively, and in the past decade, the field has turned to investi-
gating the psychology of judging.7  This research has primarily
examined the cognitive and motivational dimensions of judging, i.e.,
heuristics, motivation, biases, schemas, attitudes, and motivated cog-
nition.8  The line of inquiry, however, has largely left unexplored the
social, contextual, and situational nature of judging: one of social psy-
chology’s unique contributions to understanding judicial behavior.
This Article introduces science and research on the social psychol-
ogy of judging with the aim of advancing a research agenda designed
to examine the influence of social, contextual, and situational forces
on judicial decision-making: situated cognition.9  This research agenda
investigates the social nature of judging from the perspective of “Be-
havioral Realism.”10  In exploring this aspect of judicial behavior, the
5. See O. W. Holmes, Jr., Path of the Law, 10 HARV. L. REV. 457, 465-66 (1897) (“The
danger of which I speak of is . . . the notion that a given system, ours, for instance
can be worked out like mathematics from some general axioms of conduct . . .
[T]he logical method and form flatter that longing for certainty and repose which
is in every human mind.  But certainty generally is illusion, and repose is not the
destiny of man.  Behind the logical form lies a judgment as to the relative worth
and importance of competing legislative grounds, often an inarticulate and un-
conscious judgment, it is true, and yet the very root and nerve of the whole pro-
ceeding.”); Roscoe Pound, Mechanical Jurisprudence, 8 COLUM. L. REV. 605
(1908).
6. OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, THE COMMON LAW 1 (Mark DeWolfe Howe ed., 1963)
(1881)).
7. See generally Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Robert Mauro, Psychology and Law, in 2
THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 684 (Daniel T. Gilbert et al., eds., 1998);
Neil Vidmar, The Psychology of Trial Judging, 20 CURRENT DIRECTIONS IN
PSYCHOL. SCI. 58 (2011).
8. See, e.g., Vidmar, supra note 7, at 58–61.
9. See Eliot R. Smith & Elizabeth C. Collins, Situated Cognition, 126–40, in BATJA
MESQUITA ET AL., THE MIND IN CONTEXT (2010); Eliot R. Smith & Gu¨n R. Semin,
Socially Situated Cognition: Cognition in Its Social Context, 36 ADVANCES IN EX-
PERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 53, 53 (2004).
10. “Behavioral Realism” as used in this Article emerged from a symposium in July
2006 discussing how advances in social and cognitive psychology lend new per-
spective to jurisprudence.  After the symposium, jurists and social and cognitive
psychologists produced several noteworthy articles: Christine Jolls & Cass R.
Sunstein, The Law of Implicit Bias, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 969 (2006); Linda Hamilton
Krieger & Susan T. Fiske, Behavioral Realism in Employment Discrimination
Law: Implicit Bias and Disparate Treatment, 94 CALIF. L. REV. 997 (2006); Linda
H. Krieger, Behavioral Realism in Law: Reframing the Discussion About Social
Science’s Place in Antidiscrimination Law and Policy, in BEYOND COMMON SENSE:
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approach draws on multiple techniques, including experimental meth-
ods and theories in the field of social psychology.11  The field of social
psychology offers a unique vantage point to examine how societal
forces, social environments, and situations influence judging.12  For
the social psychologist, the level of analysis is the individual in the
context of a social situation.13  The field studies the individual within
social context to understand how social contexts, situations, and envi-
ronments influence attitudes, cognitions, and behavior.14  Further,
while much quantitative research on judicial behavior employs the
technique of empirically studying federal case law, a research line pre-
mised on social psychology would adopt both empirical legal studies
and experimental methods to study judicial behavior.15  Because the
field draws largely on experiments to investigate social and situa-
PSYCHOLOGICAL SCIENCE IN THE COURTROOM 383 (Eugene Borgida & Susan T.
Fiske eds., 2008). See also Jerry Kang & Kristin Lane, Seeing Through Color-
blindness: Implicit Bias and the Law, 58 UCLA L. REV. 465, 490–92 (2010) (artic-
ulating the paradigm of Behavioral Realism); Victor D. Quintanilla, Beyond
Common Sense: A Social Psychological Study of Iqbal’s Effect on Claims of Race
Discrimination, 17 MICH. J. RACE & L. 1 (2011) (drawing on the framework of
Behavioral Realism when studying the effects of Iqbal on civil rights claims).
11. See, e.g., Jeffrey J. Rachlinski, Heuristics, Biases, and Governance in BLACKWELL
HANDBOOK OF JUDGMENT & DECISION MAKING 567 (Derek J. Koehler & Nigel Har-
vey eds., 2004); see also HUNTINGTON CAIRNS, LAW AND THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 219
(1935) (“The development of the synthesis of law and psychology will be a long
and perhaps a tedious process; but it is a process, however much patience it may
require, which for the law will yield a fruitful harvest.”).
12. See generally ELLIOT ARONSON, THE SOCIAL ANIMAL 9 (1995) (“The social psychol-
ogist studies social situations that affect people’s behavior.”); LEE ROSS & RICH-
ARD E. NISBETT, THE PERSON AND THE SITUATION: PERSPECTIVES OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY 34 (1991); Robert B. Cialdini & Melanie R. Trost, Social Influence:
Social Norms, Conformity, and Compliance, in 2 THE HANDBOOK OF SOCIAL PSY-
CHOLOGY, supra note 7, at 151; Kurt Lewin, Behavior and Development as a Func-
tion of the Total Situation (1946), reprinted in RESOLVING SOCIAL CONFLICTS &
FIELD THEORY IN SOCIAL SCIENCE 337–38 (Amer. Psych. Ass’n. 2d ed. 2000); Shel-
ley E. Taylor, The Social Being in Social Psychology, in 1 THE HANDBOOK OF SO-
CIAL PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 7, at 58 (“[F]irst . . . individual behavior is strongly
influenced by the environment, especially the social environment.  The person
does not function in an individualistic vacuum, but in a social context that influ-
ences thought, feeling, and action. . . . [S]econd . . . the individual actively con-
strues social situations.  We do not respond to environments as they are but as we
interpret them to be.”).
13. See ELLIOT ARONSON ET AL., SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 10 (Prentice Hall 7th ed. 2010);
Taylor, supra note 12, at 58.
14. See ARONSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 3.
15. Recent empirical legal studies on how social forces influence judicial decision-
making are of excellent quality. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Andrew D. Martin, Does
Public Opinion Influence the Supreme Court? Possibly Yes (But We’re Not Sure
Why), 13 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 263 (2010).  Yet one limitation with these empirical
legal studies is the difficulty of identifying a causal mechanism that explains the
relationship between social influences and judicial decision-making. Id. at 280;
see infra Part IV.
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tional influences, the field offers both theoretical insights and an ar-
ray of scientific methods to study the social and situational
dimensions of judicial behavior.  A law and social psychology approach
to studying judicial behavior may, one day, illuminate psychological
processes by which American society acculturates and socializes
judges and, thereby, shapes law.16  As Justice Cardozo famously ob-
served, “[t]he great tides and current which engulf the rest of men do
not turn aside in their course and pass the judges by.”17  In this way, a
law and social psychology approach may, one day, uniquely contribute
to the study of how American law evolves to reflect change in Ameri-
can society.
An important theoretical contribution of social psychology is re-
search on implicit theories.  This research has revealed that humans
hold implicit theories about human nature, social institutions, and so-
ciety.  At the forefront of this science, Dr. Carol Dweck and her col-
leagues have shown that humans operate with different implicit
theories about whether these phenomena are fixed versus dynamic,
static versus malleable.18  For example, in certain circumstances, we
might believe that one’s moral character may change and develop—a
transgression today, but temperance tomorrow; in other circum-
stances, we might believe that moral character is static and cannot
change—once a scoundrel always a scoundrel.  These implicit belief
systems often operate outside of our awareness.  They shape the
meaning we draw from social contexts, the decisions we make and our
predictions, and how we attribute blame to others.  Implicit theories
are often called mindsets.  This psychological research shows that
these different implicit theories are social constructions: the implicit
beliefs are shared, expressed, and transmitted within society, organi-
zations, and environments.19  That is, social influences and situa-
16. The line of scholarship advanced by this Article focuses on the psychological
processes behind judicial decision-making—both the cognitive and, critically, the
social psychological processes underlying judicial behavior.  This line broadens
current scholarship by drawing on the experimental method and from social psy-
chological theory to study how society, culture, social influences, and situations
affect judicial behavior: judges’ cognitions, attitudes, and behaviors.  This line of
law and social psychology, therefore, intersects with several lines of jurispruden-
tial scholarship, including: Behavioral Realism, see Krieger & Fiske, supra note
10, at 1000, Situationism, see Jon Hanson & Michael McCann, Situationist Torts,
41 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 1345 (2008); Jon Hanson & David Yosifon, The Situation: An
Introduction to the Situational Character, Critical Realism, Power Economics,
and Deep Capture, 152 U. PA. L. REV. 129 (2003), and the turn toward naturalism
in jurisprudence, see BRIAN LEITER, NATURALIZING JURISPRUDENCE (2007).
17. BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE NATURE OF THE JUDICIAL PROCESS 168 (1921).
18. Carol S. Dweck et al., Implicit Theories and Their Role in Judgments & Reac-
tions: A World From Two Perspectives, 6 PSYCHOL. INQUIRY 267, 282 (1995).
19. See infra section II.C.
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tional factors influence whether we adopt fixed versus dynamic
mindsets.20
Dweck’s research suggests these implicit theories about human na-
ture, social institutions, and society may shape the deep, often uncon-
scious, presuppositions and beliefs that jurists bring to legal
decisions.21  Like lenses through which we examine the world, these
implicit belief systems shape how jurists find facts in particular dis-
putes, the inferences jurists draw, and the punishment judges im-
pose.22  As well, these implicit theories may influence how jurists
reason and resolve questions of interpretation under the common law,
statutes, and the Constitution, a matter I turn to below.23  Experi-
mental research is warranted to investigate how this science may en-
rich our understanding of legal reasoning and judicial behavior.24
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part II introduces the reader
to social psychological research on implicit theories.  Part III presents
a general discussion of how these implicit theories likely affect judicial
fact finding and the interpretation of common law, statutes, and the
Constitution.  Part IV offers closing remarks and recommendations for
a research framework to investigate these questions.
II. THE SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY OF IMPLICIT THEORIES
In recent decades, experimental psychologists have studied the im-
plicit theories people hold about personality, social arrangements, and
society.25  Leading this important line of research, Dweck and her col-
leagues have conducted seminal experiments demonstrating that peo-
ple hold markedly different implicit theories about whether human
nature and institutions are primarily fixed and static versus dynamic
and malleable.26  This research has shown that people’s implicit be-
20. See infra section II.C.
21. See infra section III.A.
22. See infra section III.A.
23. See infra section III.B.
24. See infra Part IV.
25. See Chi-yue Chiu et al., Implicit Theories and Conceptions of Morality, 73 J. PER-
SONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 923 (1997); Carol S. Dweck et al., Implicit Theories:
Individual Differences in the Likelihood and Meaning of Dispositional Inference,
19 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 644 (1993); Daniel C. Molden & Carol S.
Dweck, Finding “Meaning” in Psychology: A Lay Theories Approach to Self-Regu-
lation, Social Perception, and Social Development, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 192
(2006); Mary C. Murphy & Carol S. Dweck, A Culture of Genius: How an Organi-
zation’s Lay Theory Shapes People’s Cognition, Affect, and Behavior, 36 PERSON-
ALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 283 (2009). See generally CAROL S. DWECK,
MINDSET, THE NEW PSYCHOLOGY OF SUCCESS (2006).
26. The distinction between static and dynamic implicit theories has roots in the phi-
losophy of Alfred N. Whitehead and Stephen C. Pepper. See ALFRED NORTH
WHITEHEAD, MODES OF THOUGHT (1938); STEPHEN C. PEPPER, WORLD HYPOTHE-
SES, A STUDY IN EVIDENCE (1961).  Their scholarship discussed and contrasted
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liefs powerfully shape their perception, judgment, and decision-mak-
ing.27  These mindsets influence the meaning people draw from their
observations of others and how they understand their own exper-
iences.28  The theories are implicit because, unlike most scientific the-
ories, the theories are rarely elaborated and often operate outside of
awareness.29  Like systems of folk psychology, or larger meaning sys-
tems, these implicit beliefs strongly influence how people organize
their experience in, knowledge about, and transactions in the world.30
These mindsets shape people’s attributions and inferences, along with
social events.31  The  implicit theories are not mere individual differ-
ences or personality differences.  Instead the mindsets are expressed
and shared socially and culturally within situations and environ-
ments, which powerfully influence the degree to which these mindsets
operate.32
A. Implicit Theories of Human Nature
There are two contrasting implicit theories about personality and
moral character: human nature is static and fixed versus dynamic and
malleable.33  One theory is termed an entity mindset.  When an entity
theory is salient, people believe human nature is static, fixed, immuta-
ble, and unchangeable.34  People tend to interpret human nature
based on immutable, static traits (e.g., caring, honest, intelligent,
different systems of meaning.  Whitehead and Pepper contended that under-
standing the world as consisting of essential units with fixed properties leads to
the desire to measure these enduring properties and to build taxonomies from
them; in contrast, understanding the world as consisting of fluid processes and
dynamic contexts leads to the desire to analyze and understand the processes and
contexts shaping the world.
27. See generally Dweck et al., supra note 25, at 644.
28. See Molden & Dweck, supra note 25, at 197; Gail D. Heyman & Carol S. Dweck,
Children’s Thinking About Traits: Implications for Judgments of the Self and
Others, 64 CHILD DEV. 391 (1998).
29. See Chi-yue Chiu et al., Lay Dispositionism and Implicit Theories of Personality,
73 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 19 (1997).
30. See generally JEROME BRUNER, ACTS OF MEANING 33–66 (1990); GEORGE H. MEAD,
MIND, SELF & SOCIETY, 135–226 (1934); Isaiah Berlin, Introduction in VICO AND
HERDER: TWO STUDIES IN THE HISTORY OF IDEAS xiii-xxvii (1977).
31. See Benjamin M. Gervey et al., Differential Use of Person Information in Deci-
sions about Guilt Versus Innocence: The Role of Implicit Theories, 25 PERSONALITY
& SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 17 (1999); Daniel C. Molden et al., “Meaningful” Social
Inferences: Effects of Implicit Theories on Inferential Processes, 42 J. EXPERIMEN-
TAL SOC. PSYCHOL. 738 (2006).
32. See Murphy & Dweck, supra note 25, at 283.
33. See Dweck et al., supra note 25, at 645–46; Sheri R. Levy et al., Modes of Social
Thought: Implicit Theories and Social Understanding in DUAL-PROCESS THEORIES
IN SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY 179–201 (1999).
34. See Levy et al., supra note 33, at 192 (“[T]he entity model is built around the core
belief that people’s qualities are fixed—over time and across situations.  This
model then guides what information will be attended to and how it will be en-
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criminal, reckless).  With an entity mindset, people expect that behav-
ior is driven by essential character traits and, therefore, anticipate
that human behavior will be highly consistent across situations.35
People, moreover, draw on character traits when making predictions
about how others will behave.36  Those holding an entity theory tend
to believe the kind of person someone is, is something very basic about
that person that cannot be changed.37
The second theory is an incremental mindset.38  When an incre-
mental theory predominates, people believe human nature is mallea-
ble, changeable, and consisting of qualities that can be enhanced and
developed over time.39  When operating under an incremental mind-
set, people are sensitive to and search for psychological causes (e.g.,
beliefs, goals, hopes, fears) and situational causes of behavior.40
When this theory is salient, people expect that human nature and
moral conduct are dynamic qualities that have the potential to change
across situations.41  Those holding an incremental theory tend to be-
lieve a person can substantially change the kind of person that he or
she is.42
These mindsets influence both the frequency and the nature of dis-
positional inferences.  That is, whether we view the world through an
entity versus incremental mindset shapes whether we engage in lay
dispositionism.  An entity mindset results in lay dispositionism.43
Lay dispositionism refers to the use of personality/character traits as
the main unit of analysis when evaluating human behavior, which
tends to result in the Fundamental Attribution Error.44  The Funda-
mental Attribution Error occurs because people over attribute other
people’s actions to personality/character traits, while under appreciat-
ing the degree to which situations and environments influence behav-
ior.45  For example, when an entity theory predominates, we would
coded and organized, which in turn influences the judgments that are based on
this information.”).
35. See id.
36. See Molden et al., supra note 31, at 742.
37. See id.
38. See Levy et al., supra note 33, at 13 (“[T]he incremental mental model is built
around the core belief that people’s attributes are changeable—over time and
across situations.  The mental model then orients information processing toward
more dynamic variables and flexible judgments.”).
39. See id.
40. See id.
41. See Molden et al., supra note 31, at 742.
42. See id.
43. See Chiu et al., supra note 29, at 19.
44. See ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 12, at 34.
45. See SUSAN T. FISKE & SHELLEY E. TAYLOR, SOCIAL COGNITION 67 (2d ed. 1991);
ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 12; Ellsworth & Mauro, supra note 7, at 113; Victor
D. Quintanilla, (Mis)Judging Intent: The Fundamental Attribution Error in Fed-
eral Securities Law, Vol. 7 NYU L. & BUS. 195, 221–24 (2010).
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likely believe that a bystander is callous and cold for turning a deaf
ear to a neighbor’s cries for help by failing to dial 911.  We may believe
that the bystander’s callous personality animated her to disregard her
neighbor’s cries.  With an incremental mindset, however, people tend
to avoid lay dispositionism.  They instead believe that personality con-
sists of dynamic qualities that alter across situations.46  In this scena-
rio, we may search for a situational explanation—for example,
perhaps the number of bystanders had a powerful effect on whether
any single bystander was likely to help the victim—we may consider
whether the bystander effect or pluralistic ignorance diminished help-
ing behavior.47
In seminal experiments, Dweck and her colleagues demonstrated
that people draw different meaning from human behavior when oper-
ating with an entity versus an incremental mindset.48  When an en-
tity theory is salient, people draw dispositional inferences from
behavior in one situation and, often then, generalize from those dispo-
sitions to predict that people will behave consistently in the future.49
In these experiments, subjects predicted a person’s behavior in either
a social domain (honesty or friendliness) or an ability domain (aca-
demic or sports) after observing that person’s behavior in a single
prior situation.50  In sum, when holding an entity mindset, subjects
readily drew dispositional inferences and then predicted that people
would conform to those dispositions in future situations.51  For exam-
ple, subjects were provided with a brief scenario in which they ob-
served Jack behaving friendlier than Joe.52  When an entity mindset
predominated, subjects believed that Jack would always behave
friendlier than Joe.53  In contrast, when an incremental mindset
predominated, subjects predicted that Jack’s friendly behavior would
not generalize across situations.54  Instead, they predicted that Joe
would behave friendlier than Jack in some situations, so that Jack’s
relative friendliness over Joe would tend to even out across time.55
One psychological mechanism for this effect is that, when these
mindsets are salient, they alter the way people process social informa-
tion, shifting the degree to which people attend to expectancy consis-
46. See Chiu et al., supra note 29, at 20–21.
47. See generally BIBB LATANE´ & JOHN M. DARLEY, THE UNRESPONSIVE BYSTANDER:
WHY DOESN’T HE HELP? (1970); John M. Darley & C. Daniel Batson, “From Jeru-
salem to Jericho”: A Study of Situational and Dispositional Variables in Helping
Behavior, 27 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 100 (1973).
48. See Chiu et al., supra note 29, at 27–28.
49. See id. at 20–21.
50. See id. at 23.
51. See id.
52. See id. at 23–28.
53. See id.
54. Id.
55. Id. at 22–23.
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tent versus expectancy inconsistent information.56  With an entity
theory, people attend more closely to character-trait consistent infor-
mation.57  Once a person forms an expectation of another’s disposition
(e.g., that another is good, bad, friendly, careless, intelligent), one is
especially attentive to information that confirms this character-trait
expectation.  This expectancy confirming information provides sup-
port for a dispositional understanding of that person.  In contrast,
when an incremental theory is salient, people show less preference for
expectancy confirming information and instead attend to expectancy
disconfirming information.58  When an entity mindset predominates,
people pay closer attention to and readily recall stereotype-consistent
information.59  In experiments, Dweck and her colleagues placed par-
ticipants under cognitive load and then presented them with informa-
tion that was either consistent, inconsistent, or irrelevant to
stereotypes about targets (i.e., stereotypes about priests versus neo-
Nazi skin heads).60  When operating with an entity mindset about
personality, people clung to their preconceptions and diminished the
attention they paid to highly relevant stereotype-inconsistent infor-
mation.61  These studies suggested that, for those holding entity theo-
ries of personality, character-inconsistent information may have been
unpleasant and, hence, these entity theorists were motivated to avoid
undesirable, theory-inconsistent information.62  In contrast, when an
incremental mindset was salient, subjects drew on and paid attention
to both stereotype-consistent and stereotype-inconsistent informa-
tion.63  In sum, when holding an entity theory, rather than an incre-
mental theory, people attend more closely to stereotype-consistent
information than to stereotype-inconsistent information.64
56. See Molden et al., supra note 31, at 738; Jason E. Plaks et al., Person Theories
and Attention Allocation: Preferences for Stereotypic Versus Counterstereotypic In-
formation, 80 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 876, 888–91 (2001).
57. See Molden et al., supra note 31, at 738.
58. See Plaks et al., supra note 56, at 889–91.
59. See id. at 879–80.
60. See id.
61. See id. at 889–91.
62. See id.
63. See id.
64. See Molden & Dweck, supra note 25, at 197–99; Plaks et al., supra note 56, at
889–91.  This line of psychological research also suggested that, when operating
under an entity theory, people are more likely to engage in “entitativity,” of social
groups, meaning they are less likely to individuate members of social groups and
less likely to perceive within-group variability among group members. See Levy
et al., supra note 33, at 198; see also Brock Bastian & Nick Haslam, Psychological
Essentialism and Stereotype Endorsement, 42 J. EXPERIMENTAL SOC. PSYCHOL.
228 (2006) (explaining the phenomena of essentialism in relation to entity
theories).
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This line of research also examined the effect of holding implicit
theories of moral character.65  People with an entity theory of moral
character are more likely to make a global judgment about another’s
moral worth based on a single instance of morally relevant behavior.66
With an entity mindset, a single instance of behavior colors the overall
view of another’s moral goodness or badness.  For example, experi-
ments have shown that, when an entity theory is salient, people make
global moral character judgments about another after witnessing a
single instance of lying, aggression, or cooperation.67  When holding
an entity theory, people are more likely to believe that if a person lies,
cheats, or steals in a prior situation, then that person is an immoral
person.  While this line of research initially studied adults, similar re-
sults have been shown with early elementary school-aged children.68
These studies demonstrated that children with entity mindsets are
more likely than children with incremental mindsets to believe moral
behavior is closely linked to fixed character traits.69
B. Implicit Theories of Society and Social Institutions
Social, cognitive, and political psychologists have converged on the
finding that people hold implicit belief systems about the nature of
society and social institutions.  That is, people hold implicit theories
about whether society and social institutions are static and fixed ver-
sus dynamic and malleable.70  While some operate with an entity (or
65. See Chiu et al., supra note 25; Dweck et al., supra note 18, at 275–78; see also
PHILIP ZIMBARDO, THE LUCIFER EFFECT, UNDERSTANDING HOW GOOD PEOPLE
TURN EVIL 6–7 (2008) (“The idea that an unbridgeable chasm separates good peo-
ple from bad people . . . creates a binary logic, in which Evil is essentialized.  Most
of us perceive Evil as an entity, a quality that is inherent in some people and not
in others. . . .  An alternative conception treats evil in incrementalist terms, as
something of which we are all capable, depending on circumstances. . . .  Our
nature can be changed, whether toward the good or the bad side of human na-
ture.” (emphasis added)).
66. See Claude H. Miller et al., The Effects of Implicit Theories of Moral Character on
Affective Reactions to Moral Transgressions, 25 SOC. COGNITION 819 (2007).
67. See Cynthia A. Erdley & Carol S. Dweck, Children’s Implicit Personality Theories
as Predictors of Their Social Judgment, 64 CHILD DEV. 863 (1993); Miller et al.,
supra note 66, at 937–38.
68. See Heyman & Dweck, supra note 28.
69. See id. at 399–401.
70. See Chiu et al., supra note 25, at 923 (“Because other people and the world are
the sources of moral actions, people’s beliefs about these factors should have im-
portant implications for their moral beliefs.  People can believe, for example, that
the world and its people have fixed natures.  Alternatively, they can believe that
the world, its institutions, and its people have a character that can be shaped.”);
John T. Jost, The End of the End of Ideology, 61 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 651, 654
(2006).
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incremental) theory more chronically than other people,71 a pivotal
finding is that these implicit theories are situational—contexts and
situations powerfully affect the salience of these mindsets.72
Dweck and her colleagues have researched implicit theories about
social institutions (e.g., systems, rules, norms, hierarchies).73  Find-
ings indicate that, when people hold an entity theory of social institu-
tions, people tend to believe that rules, norms, and hierarchies are
static—these social institutions are fundamentally fixed and immuta-
ble in nature.74  With an entity mindset, people often treat as most
important conformity to stable norms, role expectations, hierarchies,
and rules within a system.75  People are especially concerned with vio-
lations of these social arrangements.  In contrast, when people hold an
incremental theory of social institutions, people tend to believe that
social institutions and existing arrangements are malleable, variable,
and changeable.76  People believe that social institutions can be
shaped and improved for the better.77  When holding an incremental
theory of social arrangements, people are especially attuned to
whether existing social institutions might be improved and whether
existing arrangements harm others or operate unjustly.78
These contrasting implicit theories are interrelated with differ-
ences between conservative and liberal ideologies: attitudes toward
tradition versus social change.79  Conservative ideology is more
closely associated with an entity view of institutions and society, ex-
alting tradition, order, hierarchy, authority, and the status quo.80
Liberal ideology is more closely associated with an incremental view of
institutions and society, valuing social reform and change that unfas-
tens tradition with the possibility of improvement.81
71. See John T. Jost & Orsolya Hunyady, Antecedents and Consequences of System-
Justifying Ideologies, 14 CURRENT DIRECTIONS PSYCHOL. SCI. 260, 261–62 (2005).
72. See Aaron C. Kay & Mark P. Zanna, A Contextual Analysis of the System Justifi-
cation Motive and Its Societal Consequence in SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES
OF IDEOLOGY AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION 158 (John T. Jost et al. eds., 2009).
73. See Chiu et al., supra note 25, at 923–34.
74. See id.
75. See id. at 924–30.
76. See id.
77. See id.
78. See id.
79. See Jost, supra note 70, at 654; John T. Jost et al., Political Conservatism as
Motivated Social Cognition, 129 PSYCHOL. BULL. 339 (2003) [hereinafter Jost et
al., Political Conservatism]; John T. Jost et al., Exceptions That Prove the Rule:
Using a Theory of Motivated Social Cognition to Account for Ideological Incongru-
ities and Political Anomalies: Reply to Greenberg and Jonas (2003), 129 PSYCHOL.
BULL. 383 (2003).
80. See Jost et al., Political Conservatism, supra note 79, at 342–44.
81. See id.
2012] JUDICIAL MINDSETS 623
These findings, moreover, interconnect with research on the phe-
nomenon of system justification.82  An entity theory of social institu-
tions closely relates to a status quo mindset.  People often equate (and
conflate) their belief about what is (an entity mindset) with their pre-
scription of what ought to be (a status quo mindset).  This naturalistic
fallacy results in the status quo bias83 and, often, the “belief in a just
world,” which is the tendency for people to believe that the world is a
fair place where people get what they deserve and, often, deserve what
they get.84  When an entity view of social institutions predominates,
people tend to believe that institutions not only are fixed, but that in-
stitutions ought to remain fixed.85  In turn, people justify the status
quo and existing social arrangements.  Scores of studies have docu-
mented a system justification motive: a motivational tendency to ra-
tionalize the status quo.86  People view existing social, economic, and
political institutions as fair, legitimate, and desirable.87  This psycho-
logical phenomenon reflects the need to imbue the status quo with le-
gitimacy, to see it as fair and natural,88 rather than illegitimate,
unfair, and arbitrary.89  Belief in a just world provides psychological
benefits, including coping with feelings of uncertainty and fulfilling a
range of existential, epistemic, and relational needs.90
Unlike a status quo (entity) theory, when people hold an incremen-
tal theory of social institutions and society, people tend to believe that
82. See Jost & Hunyady, supra note 71, at 261–62.
83. See Scott Eidelman & Christian S. Crandall, A Psychological Advantage for
the Status Quo in SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF IDEOLOGY AND SYSTEM
JUSTIFICATION, supra note 72. See generally William Samuelson & Richard
Zeckhauser, Status Quo Bias in Decision Making, 1 J. RISK & UNCERTAINTY 7
(1988).
84. See Carolyn L. Hafer & Becky L. Choma, Belief in a Just World, Perceived Fair-
ness, and Justification of the Status Quo in SOCIAL AND PSYCHOLOGICAL BASES OF
IDEOLOGY AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION, supra note 72. See generally MELVIN J.
LERNER, THE BELIEF IN A JUST WORLD: A FUNDAMENTAL DELUSION (1980).
85. See Aaron C. Kay et al., Sour Grapes, Sweet Lemons, and the Anticipatory Ration-
alization of the Status Quo, 28 PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. BULL. 1300, 1301
(2002).
86. See generally John T. Jost et al., A Decade of System Justification Theory: Accu-
mulated Evidence of Conscious and Unconscious Bolstering of the Status Quo, 25
POL. PSYCHOL. 881, 887 (2004); Hulda Thorisdottir et al., On the Social and Psy-
chological Bases of Ideology and System Justification, 3–26 in SOCIAL AND PSY-
CHOLOGICAL BASES OF IDEOLOGY AND SYSTEM JUSTIFICATION, supra note 72.
87. Experimental psychologists have termed this phenomenon the injunctification ef-
fect. See Aaron C. Kay et al., Inequality, Discrimination, and the Power of the
Status Quo: Direct Evidence for a Motivation to See the Way Things Are as the
Way They Should Be, 97 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 421 (2009).
88. See Jost et al., supra note 86, at 887.
89. See Aaron C. Kay et al., Victim Derogation and Victim Enhancement as Alternate
Routes to System Justification, 16 PSYCHOL. SCI. 240, 240 (2005).
90. See Kristin Laurin et al., Social Disadvantage and the Self-Regulatory Function
of Justice Beliefs, 100 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 149, 150 (2011).
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social institutions and society can be changed for the better.91  And
these judgments about the likelihood of change are often interrelated
with the desirability for change.92  In other words, when an incremen-
tal theory of social arrangements is salient, people tend to view
change as desirable.93  With an incremental theory, people believe
that social institutions, such as systems, rules, and norms, can and
likely may change for the better—these judgments closely relate to
preferences in favor of changing these institutions.94
Importantly, social situations and environments powerfully affect
whether people operate with a status quo (entity) mindset versus an
incremental mindset.  The expression of a status quo mindset is con-
text and situation dependent.95  That is, situational variables alter
the degree to which people view social institutions and society with an
entity versus incremental theory.  For example, status quo mindsets
are enhanced when people perceive that the system is under threat.96
Threats occur in many forms, ranging from terrorist attack, to eco-
nomic sturm and drang, to public criticism of the legitimacy of the
system.97  This may explain why, even among liberals, the shock of
the 9/11 terrorist attacks resulted in increased nationalism and sup-
port for conservative policies.98  Under conditions of pronounced un-
certainty, moreover, people who tend to hold an incremental mindset
often shift to a status quo mindset.99  Even for those who generally
operate with an incremental theory of institutions, societal influences,
including threats to and uncertainty in the system, lead to a shift to-
ward an entity and status quo mindset of institutions and society.100
C. The Social and Situational Dimension of Implicit
Theories
A recent line of Dweck’s research explores how social environments
interact with and affect the salience of particular implicit theories.101
91. See Chiu et al., supra note 25, at 923–34.
92. See Kay et al., supra note 85, at 1301 (“[T]he relevant actors engage in a rational-
ization of anticipated outcomes so that events that are perceived as more likely
come to be seen as more desirable and events that are perceived as less likely
come to be seen as less desirable.”).
93. See id. at 1300–05.
94. See id.
95. See Kay & Zanna, supra note 72, at 158–64; Jost & Hunyady, supra note 71, at
261–62.
96. See Kay & Zanna, supra note 72, at 158–64; Jost & Hunyady, supra note 71, at
261–62.
97. See Kay & Zanna, supra note 72, at 161.
98. See, e.g., Johannes Ullrich & J. Christopher Cohrs, Terrorism Salience Increases
System Justification: Experimental Evidence, 20 SOC. JUST. RES. 117 (2007).
99. See Jost & Hunyady, supra note 71, at 261–62.
100. See id.
101. See Murphy & Dweck, supra note 25, at 287.
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While some people hold one implicit theory more chronically than an-
other, contexts powerfully affect the degree to which particular im-
plicit theories predominate in the mind.102  The emerging paradigm of
situated cognition is useful for understanding these dynamic
processes.103  Experiences in social environments subtly shape human
cognitions, attitudes, and behaviors.104  That implicit theories emerge
from experience in social environments may be one reason why differ-
ent cultures tend to have different implicit theories about human na-
ture and the world.105
Murphy and Dweck have conducted experiments investigating this
situational dimension of mindsets.106  Their research examines orga-
nizational implicit theories: implicit theories held, not at the level of
the individual, but rather at the level of organizations and environ-
ments.107  These experiments broadened the traditional conception of
lay theories from an individual difference measure (varying between
individuals) to a situational measure that examines how mindsets
vary between organizations and environments.108  People interact
with environments that reflect implicit theories about intelligence,
personality, moral character, or society.109  These implicit theories
may, in turn, shape how people operate within those environments.110
Implicit theories—held at the group level—shape the inferences
and decisions of individuals.111  One psychological reason for this pro-
102. Id.  It is well established that the use of schemas is affected by their accessibility,
i.e., the extent to which a particular schema is at the forefront of one’s mind. See
ARONSON ET AL., supra note 13, at 56.  That is, schemas can become chronically
accessible because of repeated past experiences, and schemas can be primed and
become temporarily accessible because of recent exposure and experiences. Id.;
see FISKE & TAYLOR, supra note 45, at 144–45.
103. See Smith & Collins, supra note 9, at 126–27.
104. See generally ARONSON, supra note 12, at 9; ROSS & NISBETT, supra note 12, at 34;
Taylor, supra note 12, at 58 (“[I]ndividual behavior is strongly influenced by the
environment, especially the social environment.  The person does not function in
an individualistic vacuum, but in a social context that influences thought, feeling,
and action.”); ZIMBARDO, supra note 65, at 8 (“Social psychologists ask: To what
extent can an individual’s actions be traced to factors outside the actor, to situa-
tional variables and environmental processes unique to a given setting?”).
105. See Craig A. Anderson, Implicit Personality Theories and Empirical Data: Biased
Assimilation, Belief Perseverance and Change, and Covariation Detection Sensi-
tivity, 13 SOC. COGNITION 25 (1995); Chi-yue Chiu et al., Motivated Cultural Cog-
nition: The Impact of Implicit Cultural Theories on Dispositional Attribution
Varies as a Function of Need for Closure, 78 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 247
(2000); Curt Hoffman et al., The Linguistic Relativity of Person Cognition: An
English-Chinese Comparison, 51 J. PERSONALITY & SOC. PSYCHOL. 1097 (1986).
106. See Murphy & Dweck, supra note 25, at 285–93.
107. See id. at 283.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 284.
110. Id. at 293.
111. Id.
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cess is self presentation; that is, as Dr. Erving Goffman established in
his acclaimed work, humans self present the attributes that others
most value in particular environments.112  Over time, these habitu-
ated behavioral displays shape one’s self-concept.  When an organiza-
tional lay theory is salient, people tend to self present the implicit
theory that permeates in that particular environment, and these be-
havioral displays subtly shift one’s self-concept to reflect the implicit
theory held by the environment.113  For example, Murphy and Dweck
investigated organizational implicit theories about the static versus
dynamic nature of intelligence.114  When humans view the world
through an entity theory, intelligence is largely seen as a fixed trait
(you either have intelligence or you don’t); with an incremental mind-
set, intelligence is seen as a quality that is malleable and expand-
able.115  When study participants were motivated to gain acceptance
from a social group that endorsed an entity or incremental theory of
intelligence, these participants presented characteristics consistent
with the social group’s theory, highlighting either their “smarts” or
“love for developing intellect.”116  The studies showed that, when peo-
ple self present to gain acceptance from a social group, this behavioral
display affects how they later define their core sense of self.117  And
after displaying an organizational implicit theory, people drew on the
theory to evaluate others in unrelated environments.118  That is, once
a person adopts an organization’s theory, this subtly shifts one’s self-
concept, and may influence how that person later judges others in un-
related contexts.119
III. JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING AND IMPLICIT THEORIES
The psychological research introduced in Part II offers valuable in-
sight and an empirical methodology to illuminate how American soci-
ety and American law interact.  As H.L.A. Hart observed, “The law . . .
shows at a thousand points the influence of both the accepted social
morality and wider moral ideals.  These influences enter into law ei-
ther abruptly and avowedly through legislation, or silently and piece-
meal through the judicial process.”120  The making of American law is
a social endeavor shaped by jurists, legal professionals, and legal ac-
tors.  American law is a product of society, of its institutions and social
112. Id.; see ERVING GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE (1959).
113. See Murphy & Dweck, supra note 25, at 293–95.
114. Id. at 293–95.
115. Id.
116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id. at 285.
119. Id.
120. See H.L.A. HART, THE CONCEPT OF LAW 199 (Oxford Univ. Press 1982).
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arrangements, its aims and aspirations, and of its problems and pro-
gress.  As the nature of our society, its social institutions, ideologies,
and narratives, and the legal profession have changed, so has Ameri-
can law across time.121  Crosscurrents in American society shape our
legal system.122  The lines of inquiry discussed in Part II offer a
unique social psychological and empirical vantage point to study these
processes.
Society shapes our legal system, in part, through the acculturation
of legal actors.123  Social environments subtly shape implicit theories
held by jurists, which in turn affects judicial behavior and judicial de-
cision-making.  As Karl Llewellyn once observed of jurists, “By virtue
of environment and upbringing, the ethical values affecting him, the
thought patterns and mental images absorbed from his surroundings,
a man is conditioned, limited, and unconsciously constrained.”124  Le-
gal decision-making, while articulated in terms of reasoning about an-
tecedent rules, is subtly influenced by how we think: how we
categorize and draw metaphors, and our belief systems.125  When de-
ciding legal disputes, jurists are subtly influenced by implicit theories
about human nature, social institutions, and society.  In this Part, I
present several ways in which these mindsets may affect how jurists
interpret facts, draw inferences, attribute blame, and impose punish-
ment.  I will then turn to how these mindsets may affect how jurists
interpret the nature of common law, statutes, and the Constitution.
A. Implicit Theories and Fact Finding
Jerome Frank once wrote that how judges find facts in particular
cases is not a mechanical act; instead the interpretation of facts turns
on the attributes of a particular judge.126  A judge’s unique traits, dis-
121. See LAWRENCE FRIEDMAN, A HISTORY OF AMERICAN LAW 19 (2d ed. 1985); Berlin,
supra note 30, at xiii-xxvii.
122. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 121, at 16, 37.  I leave to one side Brian Tamanaha’s
masterful examination of the variegated connections between law and society.
See BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, A GENERAL JURISPRUDENCE OF LAW AND SOCIETY (2001).
123. See, e.g., PETER L. BERGER, THE SOCIAL CONSTRUCTION OF REALITY 75–78 (Anchor
1967) (“By virtue of the roles he plays the individual is inducted into specific
areas of socially objectivated knowledge, not only in the narrow cognitive sense,
but also in the sense of the “knowledge” of norms, values, and even emotions.”);
D.J. GALLIGAN, LAW IN MODERN SOCIETY 320–27 (2007); see also ANTHONY G. AM-
STERDAM & JEROME BRUNER, MINDING THE LAW 232–45 (2000) (explaining that
people define themselves in comparison to others, and that this trait is unique
only to human beings).
124. KARL LLEWELLYN, THE CASE LAW SYSTEM IN AMERICA 9–12 (Paul Gewirtz ed.,
Michael Ansaldi trans., 1989).
125. See AMSTERDAM & BRUNER, supra note 123, at 287.
126. FRANK, supra note 1 at 110; see also Jerome Frank, Say It With Music, 61 HARV.
L. REV. 921, 936–37 (1948) (“For in the last push, a judge’s decisions are the out-
come of his entire life-history. . . .  I must say emphatically that when I speak of
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positions, and habits of mind often work in shaping decisions not only
about the law, but also in the very process of perceiving and interpret-
ing what the relevant facts are.127  Research on implicit theories of
personality and moral character suggest that, on this point, Frank
was prescient.
Experimental psychologists have investigated how implicit theo-
ries of human nature and moral character affect legal decision-mak-
ing.128  In numerous studies, Dweck and colleagues provided
participants with summary transcripts of a murder trial, and experi-
mentally manipulated impressions about the defendant’s respectabil-
ity.129  These studies experimentally manipulated whether a
defendant appeared to be a businessman versus a mobster, and
whether the defendant arrived at the scene of the murder after walk-
ing from a library versus arriving on a motorcycle after visiting an
adult bookstore.130  With an entity theory, participants were more sig-
nificantly affected by cues about the defendant’s global moral charac-
ter: that is, cues about the respectability of the defendant.131  These
participants found the defendant’s appearance, interests, and style of
clothing highly informative of the defendant’s global moral charac-
ter.132  These participants concluded that such traits were unlikely to
change and, in turn, drew inferences from the defendant’s moral char-
acter to assess the likelihood that the defendant might have perpe-
trated the murder.133  In contrast, with an incremental theory of
moral character, subjects were unmoved by these character traits.134
When granted the opportunity to ask for additional evidence before
rendering a verdict, participants with an entity mindset asked for dis-
position-relevant evidence—character evidence.135  In contrast, par-
ticipants with an incremental mindset asked for information more
directly relevant to the crime itself, such as information about the
murder scene and murder weapon.136
When doling out punishment, people with an entity mindset are
more likely to punish for the purpose of retribution.137  These individ-
the obscure influences—reflecting the trial judge’s life history—which affect his
decisions, I refer primarily to his biases and predilections not with respect to the
rules . . . but with respect to the witnesses . . . .  Those prejudices are usually
deeply buried, unknown to others, often unknown to the judge himself.”).
127. See FRANK, supra note 1, at 110–12.
128. See Gervey et al., supra note 31, at 17.
129. See id. at 19.
130. See id. at 21.
131. Id. at 18.
132. Id. at 26–27.
133. Id.
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id. at 25.
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uals tend to impose greater levels of punishment for undesirable be-
havior and to withhold rewards for good behavior.138  In contrast, with
a malleable view of moral character, people are more likely to punish
for the purpose of rehabilitation.139  With an incremental theory, peo-
ple are more likely to reward good behavior and less likely to impose
as high a level of punishment for undesirable conduct.140  People with
an incremental theory use incentives to punish in a more nuanced way
with the aim of changing behavior.141
This social psychological research highlights that implicit theories
of personality and moral character can affect how particular judges
find facts, draw inferences, and reason about intent, causality, and
blame.142  This research offers one explanation why different judges
offer diverse factual assessments when deciding similar cases.
Further, implicit theories likely shape the degree to which a judge
believes that a party’s behavior was caused by stable dispositions ver-
sus the force of situations.  When viewing a party’s actions with an
entity mindset, a judge would implicitly consider a party’s character
most informative, and pay greatest attention to evidence about that
party’s personal attributes and characteristics. In this scenario, a
judge would anticipate that a party will behave consistent with past
behavior—without attending closely to whether the same psychologi-
cal forces will be in place in the future and without attending closely
to whether a party will be interacting with the same contexts and situ-
ations. In contrast, with an incremental mindset, a judge would find
most informative a party’s psychological processes and the force of
particular contexts or situations, and closely attend to that informa-
tion.  In this scenario, judges would be less likely to engage in the
Fundamental Attribution Error.143  That is, with an incremental
mindset, judges would be less likely to attribute blame based upon
dispositions or character traits and more likely to evaluate whether
situational forces affected behavior.  Lastly, the social psychological
research suggests that, with an incremental mindset, a judge would
tend to impose rehabilitative punishment, rather than retributive
punishment.144
These insights are particularly significant because, in the Ameri-
can legal system, federal judges are now far more active in managing
the pre-trial procedural phases of federal litigation.  In federal civil
litigation, federal district court judges now play a large role in deci-
138. See Chiu et al., supra note 25, at 933–35.
139. See Gervey et al., supra note 31, at 25; Miller et al., supra note 66, at 826–28.
140. See Chiu et al., supra note 25, at 933–35.
141. See id.
142. See supra Part II.
143. See supra Part II.
144. See Chiu et al., supra note 25, at 933–35.
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phering and drawing inferences from facts in a variety of stages: in-
cluding the pleading stage, the class certification stage, expert witness
screening, and summary judgment.145  Further, in criminal cases, fed-
eral district court judges are granted wide discretion when selecting
and imposing sentences, especially because the federal sentencing
guidelines are now advisory.146
B. Implicit Theories and Jurisprudence
Dualities have persisted across time in American jurisprudence:
Legal Formalism versus Legal Realism,147 Legalism versus Pragma-
tism,148 Originalism versus Non-originalism.149  Behind these duali-
ties are different conceptions about whether American law is fixed and
static versus dynamic and incremental.  Some contend that jurists
must approach American law as fixed and static when resolving dis-
putes.150  Yet legal actors—judges, legal scholars, advocates, and
other officials—are acculturated in both conceptions of the law, and
make use of them in different circumstances.151
These distinct conceptions of law largely differ in the degree to
which they afford judges discretion to adapt jurisprudence to reflect
societal change and changed circumstances.  An entity conception of
law regards law as fixed.  Under this mindset, people believe that ju-
145. See, e.g., Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662 (2009); Tellabs, Inc. v. Makor Issues &
Rights, Ltd., 551 U.S. 308, 328 (2007). See generally Arthur Miller, From Conley
to Twombly to Iqbal: A Double Play on the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, 60
DUKE L.J. 1, 1–17 (2010); Quintanilla, supra note 10.
146. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) (2006); see, e.g., Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51
(2007).
147. See, e.g., Introduction in AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM xi-xv (William W. Fisher III et
al., eds., 1993); Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 457–60; Roscoe Pound, Law in Books
and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12 (1910); Edward Rubin, The Real Formalists,
the Real Realists, and What They Tell Us About Judicial Decision Making and
Legal Education, 109 MICH. L. REV. 863 (2011).
148. See, e.g., RICHARD A. POSNER, HOW JUDGES THINK 230–65 (2008); Richard A. Pos-
ner, Some Realism About Judges: A Reply to Edwards and Livermore, 59 DUKE
L.J. 1177 (2010).
149. See ANTONIN SCALIA, A MATTER OF INTERPRETATION, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE
LAW (1997); DAVID A. STRAUSS, THE LIVING CONSTITUTION (2010); Phillip Bobbitt,
The Modalities of Constitutional Argument, CONST. INTERPRETATION 12–22
(1991); Paul Brest, The Misconceived Quest for the Original Understanding, 60
B.U. L. REV. 204 (1980); Thomas B. Colby & Peter J. Smith, Living Originalism,
59 DUKE L.J. 239, 258 (2009); Richard S. Kay, Adherence to the Original Inten-
tions in Constitutional Adjudication: Three Objections and Responses, 82 NW. U.
L. REV. 226 (1988).
150. See POSNER, supra note 148, at 41–44 (critiquing Legalism as a theory of judicial
behavior).
151. See EDWARD H. LEVI, AN INTRODUCTION TO LEGAL REASONING (1948); KARL LLEW-
ELLYN, THE THEORY OF RULES 42–44 (Frederick Schauer ed., 2011); POSNER,
supra note 148, at 230–31; BRIAN Z. TAMANAHA, BEYOND THE FORMALIST-REALIST
DIVIDE, THE ROLE OF POLITICS IN JUDGING, 181–199 (2010).
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rists must apply the law deductively from positive law sources—prece-
dents, statutes, constitutional text or original intent.  Judges should
reason formalistically without improving rules to reflect societal
change, change in institutions and social arrangements, or tailoring
rules to reflect the particular circumstances of the case before
them.152
An incremental conception of law, in contrast, regards law as dy-
namic.  When an incremental theory of law is salient, people believe
that judges must be sensitive to whether they are grappling with new
problems, contexts, or situations.  People believe that judges are al-
lowed to draw on the discretion and leeway that the law affords them
to address the particular patterns before them.  When approaching le-
gal questions, jurists may reason instrumentally and improve upon
jurisprudence, not simply in common law cases, but also in cases in-
volving statutes and the Constitution.  This incremental conception is
exemplified by pragmatism.153  As Judge Posner has explained, this
form of pragmatic adjudication turns on a concern for consequences,
rather than abstract concepts or generalities.154
While these different conceptions of law persist in the background
of American jurisprudence, judicial decision-making tends to be rea-
sonably predictable.155  In many circumstances, rules are clear (or
clear enough) that the result of legal reasoning by officials trained in
the law is reasonably certain.156  In other circumstances, however,
rules are unclear, even to jurists steeped in the law.  Jurists are forced
to interpret rules, to grapple with gaps, and to resolve conflicts or am-
biguities when facing novel circumstances, questions, and
problems.157  In these circumstances, the law provides judges leeway
to adapt jurisprudence in instrumental fashion.158  These legalisti-
152. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 151; POSNER, supra note 148, at 175–76, 230–31,
254–55; Charles D. Breitel, The Courts and Lawmaking in LEGAL INSTITUTIONS
TODAY AND TOMORROW 1–39 (1959).
153. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 151; POSNER, supra note 148, at 175–76, 230–31,
254–55; Breitel, supra note 152, at 1–39.
154. See POSNER, supra note 148, at 238.
155. See LLEWELLYN, supra note 151, at 42–44; KARL LLEWELLYN, THE COMMON LAW
TRADITION 19–50 (1960); Posner, supra note 148, at 1179–80;.
156. See H.L.A. HART, supra note 120, at 141; LLEWELLYN, supra note 151, at 42–44;
LLEWELLYN, supra note 155, at 19–50.
157. See LEVI, supra note 151, at 1–5; LLEWELLYN, supra note 151, at 42–44; Duncan
Kennedy, Three Globalizations of Law and Legal Thought: 1850–2000 in THE
NEW LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT 45 (David M. Trubek & Alvaro Santos
eds., 2006); HART, supra note 120, at 128, 272–76; Llewellyn, supra note 1;
Pound, supra note 147.
158. See, e.g., BENJAMIN N. CARDOZO, THE GROWTH OF THE LAW 73 (1924); HART, supra
note 120, at 272 (“[I]n any legal system there will always be certain legally unreg-
ulated cases in which on some point no decision either way is dictated by the law
and the law is accordingly party indeterminate or incomplete. . . .  If in such cases
the judge is to reach a decision . . . he must exercise his discretion and make law
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cally indeterminate cases tend to shape American law.  Put another
way, “[t]oday’s law, insofar as it is the product of judicial decision, is
the product of decisions that were stabs in the dark rather than appli-
cations of settled law.”159  This may explain why, as Judge Posner has
observed, while the pragmatist label describes many American judges,
most American judges are legalists in some cases and pragmatists in
others.160  This mirrors social psychological research on implicit theo-
ries: while one theory may be more chronically salient for some people,
situations and contexts can shift people to hold the opposite mindset—
both are plausible.161
The research presented in Part II provides important insight, re-
vealing social psychological reasons why (and better, when) jurists
may operate under either an entity versus incremental conception of
law.  Because social psychologists have not fully investigated how im-
plicit theories affect legal reasoning and reasoning from precedent, I
propose a research line be designed to better understand the condi-
tions when these implicit theories shape judicial behavior.  An initial
hypothesis: when jurists operate with an entity (status quo) theory of
society and social institutions, jurists would tend to believe that soci-
ety and its social arrangements have not changed, jurists would likely
draw on a fixed conception of law.  In contrast, with an incremental
theory of society and social institutions, jurists would tend to believe
that society and its social arrangements have changed, jurists would
likely draw on an incremental conception of law.
Humans strive for congruence, consistency, integration, and bal-
ance among various cognitions: their beliefs, values, attitudes, and im-
plicit theories.162  When we experience our cognitions as inconsistent,
especially when the cognitions are important, we feel psychological
tension—cognitive dissonance.163  When an entity (status quo) theory
of society and social institutions is salient, jurists would perceive that
society, its social arrangements, norms, customs, traditions, and be-
haviors remain unchanged.164  In this mindset, the most congruent
cognition is an entity conception of law, where law is considered to be
static, fixed, immutable, and predetermined.  Within American law,
for the case instead of merely applying already pre-existing settled law.”); LEVI,
supra note 151, at 3–4.
159. Posner, supra note 148, at 1180.
160. POSNER, supra note 148, at 231.
161. See supra section II.C.; see, e.g., Murphy & Dweck, supra note 25.
162. See Joel Cooper, Cognitive Consistency in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SO-
CIAL PSYCHOLOGY 99–104 (Antony S.R. Manstead & Miles Hewstone eds., 1996)
(collecting social psychological studies).
163. See LEON FESTINGER, A THEORY OF COGNITIVE DISSONANCE (1957); Caryl E. Rus-
bult, Cognitive Dissonance Theory in THE BLACKWELL ENCYCLOPEDIA OF SOCIAL
PSYCHOLOGY, supra note 162, at 104–08.
164. See supra section II.B.
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this theory tends to be reflected as Formalism or Legalism in the com-
mon law, as strict textualism in statutory interpretation, and as
Originalism in constitutional law.
In contrast, when an incremental theory of society or social institu-
tions is salient, jurists would perceive that society and its social ar-
rangements, norms, customs, traditions, and behavior have either
changed or anticipate that such social institutions can be improved for
the better.  In this mindset, the most congruent cognition is an incre-
mental conception of the law, where law is considered dynamic, flexi-
ble, and malleable.165  Within American law, this theory tends to be
reflected as Legal Realism or Pragmatism in the common law, as al-
lowing the use of legislative history and purpose in statutory interpre-
tation, and as non-Originalism or minimalism in constitutional law.
The pivotal question then becomes when—in what situations and
contexts—will an entity versus incremental mindset of institutions
and society be salient?  The research presented in Part II reveals that
social and situational forces strongly influence this psychological phe-
nomenon.166  Society, social groups, and organizations socialize and
acculturate members in habits, belief structures, ideologies, patterns
of thinking, and in implicit theories.167  Though people are often moti-
vated to view institutions and society as stable and the status quo as
legitimate,168 some people hold incremental theories of institu-
tions.169  Yet contextual and situational factors heighten entity (sta-
tus quo) mindsets even for those who tend to hold incremental
mindsets.170  For example, when American society is perceived as
threatened or when the legitimacy of the system is challenged, even
those who often view institutions with incremental mindsets tend to
shift toward entity (status quo) mindsets resistant of change.171  Fi-
nally, on politically charged issues, political ideology might influence
how jurists achieve consistency among their cognitions: for example,
political ideology might influence perception and whether some jurists
view the status quo as fixed and, if so, their beliefs about whether the
status quo should remain unchanged.172
165. See supra section II.B.
166. See supra section II.C. See generally Kay & Zanna, supra note 72, at 158–81;
Murphy & Dweck, supra note 25, at 283.
167. See generally BERGER, supra note 123, at 47–128; BRUNER, supra note 30, at
33–66; MEAD, supra note 30, at 135–26; Berlin, supra note 30, at xiii-xxvii.
168. See, e.g., Jost et al., supra note 86, at 887; Kay et al., supra note 87, at 422.
169. See supra section II.B.
170. See supra section II.C. See generally, Kay & Zanna, supra note 72, at 158–81;
Murphy & Dweck, supra note 25, at 283.
171. See Kay & Zanna, supra note 72, at 158–81.
172. See Lawrence Baum, Motivation and Judicial Behavior: Expanding The Scope of
the Inquiry in THE PSYCHOLOGY OF JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING 16–17 (David
Klein & Gregory Mitchell eds., 2010); E. Braman & T.E. Nelson, Mechanism of
Motivated Reasoning?: Analogical Perception in Discrimination Disputes, 51 AM.
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1. The Common Law
A vivid illustration of the tension between entity and incremental
conceptions of American law is the friction between adherents of For-
malism versus Legal Realism at the beginning of the twentieth cen-
tury.  In reasoning under the common law, on the one hand, courts
apply precedents, which provide a sense of stability and certainty in
the common law system.  Reasoning under a system of precedent pools
experience from past eras to problems in the present day.173  On the
other hand, while past experience offers a guide, the common law pro-
vides leeway for new approaches to contemporary problems.174  Under
the common law, courts are permitted to adapt jurisprudence to bring
the common law in line with current social conditions.  The tension
between these contrasting conceptions was especially pronounced in
American jurisprudence during the 1920s–40s after the tectonic socie-
tal and economic transformations brought about by the Industrial
Revolution and New Deal.175
Christopher Langdell, dean of the Harvard Law School from 1870
to 1895, was one of the chief proponents of Formalism.176  Formalism
reflected an entity theory, or fixed mindset, of the common law, es-
pousing the view that legal rules were fixed and mechanically ap-
plied.177  Langdell advanced a metaphysics of the common law based
J. POL. SCI. 940 (2007). See generally Ziva Kunda, The Case for Motivated Rea-
soning, 108 PSYCHOL. BULL. 480 (1990).
173. See CARDOZO, supra note 17, at 149–50; LLEWELLYN, supra note 124, at 5–9;
David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Interpretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV.
877, 893–94 (1996); cf. Edmund Burke, Reflections on the Revolution in France in
THE PORTABLE EDMUND BURKE 416–51 (Isaac Kramnick ed., 1999).
174. See, e.g., CARDOZO, supra note 158, at 70, 73, 85; HART, supra note 120, at 273;
Pound, supra note 5, at 606 (“The effect of all system is apt to be petrification of
the subject systematized.  Perfection of scientific system and exposition tends to
cut off individual initiative in the future, to stifle independent consideration of
new problems and of new phases of old problems, and to impose the ideas of one
generation upon anther.  This is so on all departments of learning.”); Strauss,
supra note 173, at 893–94.
175. See generally AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 147; MAUREEN A. FLANAGAN,
AMERICA REFORMED: PROGRESSIVES AND PROGRESSIVISMS, 1880–1920 (2007); Karl
Llewellyn, Some Realism About Realism–Responding To Dean Pound, 44 HARV.
L. REV. 1222 (1931).  By no means do I suggest that all jurists in the first epoch
behaved as Formalists and that all jurists in the second epoch behaved as Legal
Realists. See TAMANAHA, supra note 151.  Nonetheless, the social conceptions of
law as more or less static and dynamic during these periods altered.  During
these periods philosophies and approaches in a number of disciplines changed
markedly. See generally JOHN DEWEY, CREATIVE INTELLIGENCE, ESSAYS IN THE
PRAGMATIC ATTITUDE (1917).
176. See ANTHONY T. KRONMAN, THE LOST LAWYER: FAILING IDEALS OF THE LEGAL PRO-
FESSION 170–74 (1995).
177. See Burt Neuborne, Of Sausage Factories and Syllogism Machines: Formalism,
Realism, and Exclusionary Selection Techniques, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 419, 421
(1992); BRIAN BIX, JURISPRUDENCE: THEORY AND CONTEXT 183 (4th ed. 2006);
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on a taxonomy harkening back to Aristotelian biology and Euclidean
geometry.178  The common law existed as a corpus of rules, with corol-
laries directly deducible from these antecedent rules.179  Each legal
decision fit neatly into the classification system as an example of a
particular legal proposition (in much the same way that under Aristo-
telian biology, each species fits into a genus).180  Legal decisions were
directly deducible and determinable from the rules themselves.  Lang-
dell advanced the classification system as both a description of the
common law system and a normative vision of what the common law
system should aspire to be.181  Formalism viewed jurisprudence as
fundamentally fixed.182  While the common law applied new cases to
antecedent legal premises, these premises were merely “found” and
applied in syllogistic fashion to resolve disputes.183
The dawn of the twentieth century transformed American society,
art, culture, philosophy, technology, and science.  During this period of
flux, a progressive group of legal scholars incorporated insights from
the philosophical pragmatism of William James and John Dewey,
Darwin’s theory of evolution, Einstein’s theory of physics, and new ap-
proaches in the behavioral sciences, including experimental psychol-
ogy and anthropology, into American law and legal reasoning.184
Their scholarship questioned the entity theory of the common law, in-
cluding the belief the common law deterministically derived from a
taxonomy of antecedent rules.185  Their scholarship advanced a socio-
logical jurisprudence and proposed innovation of the common law to
reflect changing conditions in American society.186  The scholarship of
this group is known as Legal Realism.187
Legal Realism advanced an incremental theory of the common law,
one rooted in dynamic notions of judicial decision-making.  Justice
Holmes inspired the thinking of these scholars with his celebrated in-
sight: “The actual life of the law has not been logic: it has been experi-
ence.”188  Legal Realism regarded the systemization of the common
STEVEN J. BURTON, AN INTRODUCTION TO LAW AND LEGAL REASONING 3 (2d ed.
1995).
178. See KRONMAN, supra note 176, at 170–74.
179. See id.
180. See id.
181. See id.
182. See id.
183. See generally Thomas Grey, Langdell’s Orthodoxy, 45 U. PITT. L. REV. 1 (1983);
Frederick Schauer, Formalism, 97 YALE L.J. 509 (1988).
184. See generally AMERICAN LEGAL REALISM, supra note 147, at xi–xv.
185. See id.
186. See id.
187. See Brian Leiter, Positivism, Formalism, Realism, 99 COLUM. L. REV. 1138,
1147–48 (1999).
188. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 1.
636 NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW [Vol. 90:611
law as an instrument, not as an end.189  If Formalism reflected the
fixed and final nature of Aristotle’s biology, then Legal Realism re-
flected the dynamic and ever-changing nature of Darwin’s theory of
evolution.  Rules were instruments of inquiry, providing the means of
improving, facilitating, and clarifying the process that leads to con-
crete decisions.  Rules operated as hypotheses to be tested and evalu-
ated when reaching prudent decisions in particular cases.190  One key
insight was that the deductive exposition in legal decisions set forth
the result of thinking, rather than the operation of thinking.191  De-
ductive exposition often obscured the process of judicial decision-mak-
ing and the search for solutions.  As Justice Cardozo once wrote, “The
problem stood before me in a new light when I had to cope with it as a
judge.  I found that the creative element was greater than I had fan-
cied; the forks in the road more frequent; the signposts less com-
plete.”192  Faith in mechanical jurisprudence provided the illusion of
impersonal, objective, and rational decision-making, and the illusion
of theoretical certainty.  Yet Legal Realists believed that, in times of
flux, theoretical certainty was myth: that practical certainty was in-
compatible with fixed antecedent rules and required intelligent con-
sideration of the consequences of legal rules in particular contexts.193
This incremental conception of law strongly influences contempo-
rary American legal thought.  Most jurists and legal scholars agree
that non-legal factors (extra-legal variables) affect judicial behav-
ior.194  Further, even those who generally espouse entity conceptions
of statutory and constitutional law grant that, in certain contexts,
common law judges may engage in instrumental reasoning.195  Thus,
the common law is often conceived of as a “moving classification sys-
tem.”196  Today, judging under the common law is a process where
precedents evolve, where there is a legitimate role for judgments
about fairness and public policy.197  Development and adaptation is
viewed as a dynamic quality of the common law, a means for the com-
189. See John Dewey, Logical Method and Law, 10 CORNELL L.Q. 17, 23–24 (1924).
190. See CARDOZO, supra note 158, at 73; KRONMAN, supra note 176, at 196; Dewey,
supra note 189, at 23–24.
191. See Dewey, supra note 189, at 23–24.
192. CARDOZO, supra note 158, at 57.
193. See LEITER, supra note 16, 28–30; Llewellyn, supra note 1, at 457–60.
194. See supra notes 2–4 and accompanying text; LEE EPSTEIN & JACK KNIGHT, THE
CHOICES JUDGES MAKE xiii (1998); Charles Gardner Geyh, Can the Rule of Law
Survive? Can the Rules of Law Survive Judicial Politics? (forthcoming 2012) (un-
published manuscript) (on file with author) (collecting empirical scholarship on
judicial behavior); Gregory Sisk, Book Review, The Quantitative Moment and the
Qualitative Opportunity: Legal Studies of Judicial Decision-Making, 93 CORNELL
L. REV. 873, 876 (2008).
195. See POSNER, supra note 148, at 84–87.
196. See LEVI, supra note 151, at 4–5.
197. See STRAUSS, supra note 149, at 38–39.
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mon law to express changing conditions, social arrangements, and ide-
als within the community.198
To summarize, these different conceptions of law are subtle; and,
in many cases, operate outside of awareness.  Social, contextual, and
situational factors likely influence the degree to which an entity or
incremental theory of social institutions or society is salient in a ju-
rist’s mind, which in turn, influences the degree to which jurists ap-
proach legal questions with either static versus dynamic conceptions
of law.  When an entity theory is salient in a jurist’s mind, the most
congruent conception is an entity conception of law, emphasizing the
static, fixed, final aspects of legal rules.  Under this entity mindset,
jurists would attend to antecedent rules without examining the open
texture within them.  Jurists would tend to syllogistically apply those
rules to the dispute at hand.199  Holding this mindset, jurists would
likely regard the common law as mainly matured and closed.  In con-
trast, when an incremental theory predominates, the most congruent
belief is an incremental conception of law, one that allows for adapta-
tion, innovation, and change.  With an incremental mindset, jurists
would perceive the conflict, gaps, and ambiguity in the common law
and open texture within rules.  Jurists would perceive the leeway af-
forded to them for instrumental consideration of public policy.
2. Statutory Interpretation
Having described how implicit theories may affect legal reasoning
under the common law, I now turn to how implicit theories may shape
statutory interpretation.  Statutes have largely displaced the common
law;200 hence, understanding how jurists interpret statutes is critical
for discerning how our society addresses the social problems of its day:
civil rights, economic, consumer, and environmental, among other
challenges.
Scholars have produced excellent scholarship on the myriad of le-
gitimate modes for interpreting statutes: strict construction, purpo-
sive, and pragmatic.201  In American law, these divergent modes of
statutory interpretation coexist.  Under appropriate conditions, our le-
198. See LEVI, supra note 151, at 102–04.
199. Cf. Pound, supra note 5, at 607.
200. See GUIDO CALABRESI, A COMMON LAW FOR THE AGE OF STATUTES 1 (1982) (“The
last fifty to eighty years have seen a fundamental change in American law.  In
this time we have gone from a legal system dominated by the common law, di-
vined by courts, to one in which statutes, enacted by legislatures, have become
the primary source of law.”); see also SCALIA, supra note 148, at 13 (“We live in an
age of legislation, and most new law is statutory law.”).
201. See, e.g., FRANK B. CROSS, THE THEORY AND PRACTICE OF STATUTORY INTERPRETA-
TION (2009); WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., DYNAMIC STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
(1994); LAWRENCE M. SOLAN, THE LANGUAGE OF STATUTES LAWS AND THEIR INTER-
PRETATION 51 (2010); Breitel, supra note 152, at 1–39.
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gal culture regards each as legitimate.202  Professor Frank Cross has,
therefore, aptly termed this form of interpretive diversity, interpretive
pluralism.203  The methods differ regarding the kinds of information
that jurists may consider when interpreting and applying statutes.204
Nonetheless, these methods share common ground—including, a com-
mitment to the rule of law and democratic legitimacy.205
In light of this interpretive pluralism, implicit theories likely influ-
ence how jurists select among the divergent modes.  All else being
equal, jurists would likely select a form of statutory interpretation
most congruent with the implicit theory salient in mind.  When jurists
view society with a status quo (entity) mindset, jurists would tend to
believe that Congress anticipated the static problem at issue, ad-
dressed the problem with the precise statutory provision at issue, and
that the court’s role is merely to serve as a “faithful agent” applying
the directions set forth in the statute.206  The congruent jurispruden-
tial techniques would tend to be static methods of statutory
construction.
In contrast, with an incremental mindset, jurists would view dy-
namic societal problems as potentially unanticipated by Congress and
as presenting novel and nuanced questions of statutory interpreta-
tion.  Jurists would likely draw on congruent techniques of statutory
interpretation that afford flexibility to accomplish the purposes of the
statute—how the legislature may have solved the problem under new
conditions.  This mode of judicial decision-making is more closely al-
igned with a pragmatic and “instrumental theory” of statutory inter-
202. See, e.g., Karl N. Llewellyn, Remarks on the Theory of Appellate Decision and the
Rules or Canons about How Statutes Are to be Construed, 3 VAND. L. REV. 395,
398-401 (1950).
203. See CROSS, supra note 201, at 167–70; Nicholas Zeppos, The Use of Authority in
Statutory Interpretation: An Empirical Analysis, 70 TEX. L. REV. 1073 (1992); see
also William Eskridge, Jr. & Philip Frickey, Statutory Interpretation as Practical
Reasoning, 42 STAN. L. REV. 321 (1990) (describing different modes of statutory
interpretation).
204. WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE ET AL., LEGISLATION AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
219–52 (2d ed. 2006).
205. See SOLAN, supra note 201, at 51; ESKRIDGE ET AL., supra note 204, at 219–52;
Mark Tushnet, Theory and Practice in Statutory Interpretation, 43 TEX. TECH L.
REV. 1185 (2011).
206. See John F. Duffy, Administrative Common Law in Judicial Review, 77 TEX. L.
REV. 113, 116 (1998) (“[L]egislators are the lawgivers . . . [and so] courts deciding
statutory cases are bound to follow commands and policies embodied in the en-
acted text—commands and policies the courts did not create and cannot
change.”); Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the Regulatory State, 103
HARV. L. REV. 405, 415 (1989) (“According to the most prominent conception of
the role of courts in statutory construction, judges are agents or servants of the
legislature. . . .  The judicial task is to discern and apply a judgment made by
others, most notably the legislature.”).
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pretation.207  Legislative context also matters.  That is, an
incremental mode of statutory interpretation may be chronically sali-
ent when dealing with particular statutes.  For example, some federal
statutes task judges with applying broad, sweeping provisions, such
as the Sherman Act.  Most jurists agree that such statutes are essen-
tially common law statutes that delegate a law making function to fed-
eral courts.208  Thus, many jurists adopt incremental theories when
applying these common law statutes.
The methods most congruent with an entity mindset are strict con-
structionism and new textualism.209  When drawing on these tech-
niques of statutory interpretation, jurists look no further than the
plain meaning of the statute without resorting to legislative his-
tory.210  The text of the statute is said to bind decision-making and to
express the intent of the drafters.211  Proponents argue these methods
narrow the range of judicial discretion and prevent jurists from weav-
ing in their ideological preferences onto statutes.212  At surface, these
entity methods seem quite rigid and inflexible and seem to limit judi-
cial discretion.  Jurists are said to apply statutes syllogistically—com-
paring the plain meaning of the statute to the particular facts of each
case—answering any lingering questions of statutory meaning from
an ordinary reader’s perspective supplemented with rules of interpre-
tation.213  Slightly below the surface, however, even these techniques
offer sub-doctrinal leeway for jurists to interpret the plain meaning of
statutes in light of background and context.  For example, jurists may
select among varied connotations of plain meanings premised on “ordi-
nary” versus “dictionary” usage; and if dictionary usage is chosen, ju-
rists may select among different dictionaries.214  Nor would these
methods prevent jurists from applying prior precedent on the statu-
tory provision in dispute.215  In this way, even strict constructionism
allows leeway for statutory interpretation: at times, less contexualized
(more static and entity oriented), at times more contextualized (dy-
namic and more incremental oriented).
207. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 201, at 116–18; Jonathan T. Molot, The Judicial Per-
spective in the Administrative State: Reconciling Modern Doctrines of Deference
with the Judiciary’s Structural Role, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1, 3–7 (2000) (describing
the “instrumentalist” approach).
208. See Zeppos, supra note 203, at 1100.
209. See SCALIA, supra note 149, at 3–47. See generally William Eskridge, Jr., The
New Textualism, 37 UCLA L. REV. 621 (1990).
210. See generally Eskridge, supra note 209, at 623–24.
211. See CROSS, supra note 201, at 11; SCALIA, supra note 149, at 3–47.
212. See CROSS, supra note 201, at 11; SCALIA, supra note 149, at 13.
213. See CROSS, supra note 201, at 11, 24–57; ADRIAN VERMEULE, JUDGING UNDER UN-
CERTAINTY: AN INSTITUTIONAL THEORY OF LEGAL INTERPRETATION 183–228 (2006).
214. See CROSS, supra note 201, at 28–30.
215. See id.
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The methods most congruent with an incremental mindset are
purposivism and pragmatic modes of statutory interpretation.216
These dynamic techniques allow jurists to consider legislative materi-
als when grappling with novel or nuanced questions of construction.
Proponents of purposivism believe jurists should resolve questions of
statutory interpretation in light of legislative purposes and what the
legislature likely would have intended when facing new aspects of the
problem.217  Related, the pragmatic method is oriented toward
partnering with the legislature to ensure a reasonable legal sys-
tem.218  This pragmatism varies in potency, but tends to be exercised
in modest fashion, tailoring legal language to circumstances in a con-
sequentialist style of reasoning.219  Both purposivism and pragma-
tism are more dynamic and flexible than strict construction and
textualism and allow jurists to consider how society and social ar-
rangements have changed.220
3. Constitutional Law
The Constitution, the oldest and among the shortest constitutions
in the world,221 is a broad framework for our democratic system of
government.  Our venerable Constitution has an enduring vitality, in
part, because many constitutional provisions sweep in broad, open-
textured terms—“liberty,” “due process of law,” “cruel and unusual
punishment,” “equal protection”—open to construction by each pass-
ing generation.222  In articulating a theory of judicial review, Chief
216. See CALABRESI, supra note 200, at 164; ESKRIDGE, supra note 204, at 245–51; ES-
KRIDGE, supra note 201.
217. See ESKRIDGE, supra note 204, at 228–30; see, e.g., Richard A. Posner, Statutory
Interpretation in the Classroom and in the Courtroom, 50 U. CHI. L. REV. 800, 817
(1983).
218. See CROSS, supra note 201, at 13, 102–33. See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note
201.
219. See CROSS, supra note 201, at 13, 102–33.
220. See id. See generally ESKRIDGE, supra note 201.
221. See Stephen Gardbaum, The Myth and Reality of American Constitutional Excep-
tionalism, 107 MICH. L. REV. 391, 399–401 (2008).
222. See generally AKHIL REED AMAR, THE BILL OF RIGHTS: CREATION AND RECON-
STRUCTION (1998); Jack M. Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Con-
stitution, 103 NW. U. L. REV. 549 (2009); Jack Balkin, Original Meaning and
Constitutional Redemption, 24 CONST. COMMENT. 427, 460–61 (2007); see Letter
from Thomas Jefferson to Samuel Kercheval (June 12, 1816), http://teaching
americanhistory.org/library/index.sp?document=459 (“Some men look at consti-
tutions with sanctimonious reverence, and . . . ascribe to the men of the preceding
age a wisdom more than human, and suppose what they did to be beyond amend-
ment.  I knew that age well . . .  It was very like the present, but without the
experience of the present . . .  [L]aws and institutions must go hand in hand with
the progress of the human mind.  As that becomes more developed, more enlight-
ened, as new discoveries are made, new truths disclosed, and manners and opin-
ions change with the change of circumstances, institutions must advance also,
and keep pace with the times.”).
2012] JUDICIAL MINDSETS 641
Justice John Marshall, famously observed the Constitution was not
meant to have the
prolixity of a legal code, its nature . . . requires that only its great outlines
should be marked, its important objects designated, and the minor ingredients
which compose those objects be deduced from the nature of the objects them-
selves . . . . [W]e must never forget that it is a constitution we are ex-
pounding. . . . [A] constitution, intended to endure for ages to come, and
consequently, to be adapted to the various crisis of human affairs.223
Chief Justice Marshall’s pronouncement raised then, and to this day
raises, the enduring question of how the Constitution may be
interpreted.
Throughout history, jurists have drawn on different methods of
constitutional interpretation.224  No single modality is mandatory
(i.e., the Constitution does not expressly require a single, specific tech-
nique of constitutional interpretation); and no single modality has re-
mained ascendant across time.225  As with statutory interpretation,
interpretive pluralism best describes how the Constitution is inter-
preted today.226  In some contexts, and for some constitutional provi-
sions, jurists draw on a textual mode of constitutional interpretation,
drawing on common understandings of the Constitution’s text.  In
other contexts, and for other constitutional provisions, jurists draw on
Originalism: attempting to decipher the original intent of the fram-
ers227 or the original meaning of the Constitution as understood by
the American public at the time of its adoption.228  In still other con-
texts, jurists infer rules from democratic theory or the structure of the
223. McCulluch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 316, 407 (1819).
224. See generally PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 12–13 (1991);
PHILLIP BOBBITT, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY OF THE CONSTITUTION (1982).
225. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, A CONSTITUTION OF MANY MINDS, WHY THE FOUND-
ING DOCUMENT DOESN’T MEAN WHAT IT MEANT BEFORE 19 (2009) (“Many people
claim that the Constitution must be interpreted in their preferred way.  They
insist that the very idea of interpretation requires judges to adopt their own
method of construing the founding document.  These claims are wrong.  No ap-
proach to constitutional interpretation is mandatory.”).
226. See Laurence H. Tribe, An Open Letter to Readers of American Constitutional
Law, 9 (Apr. 29, 2005), http://www.scotusblog.com/movabletype/archives/Tribe-
Treatise-Green%20Bag%202005%20low20res.pdf (noting that divisions in consti-
tutional interpretation “have become too plain—and too pronounced—to paper
over by routine appeals to the standard operating procedures of the legislative-
judicial division of authority, the routine premises of the federal-state allocation
of power, and the usual methods for extracting meaning from notoriously ambig-
uous texts”).
227. See, e.g., Earl Maltz, Some New Thoughts on an Old Problem—The Role of the
Intent of the Framers in Constitutional Theory, 63 B.U. L. REV. 811, 811–12
(1983); Keith E. Whittington, The New Originalism, 2 GEO. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y
599, 599 (2004).
228. See KEITH E. WHITTINGTON, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION: TEXTUAL MEAN-
ING, ORIGINAL INTENT, AND JUDICIAL REVIEW 60 (1999); SCALIA, supra note 149, at
38; Thomas B. Colby, The Federal Marriage Amendment and the False Promise of
Originalism, 108 COLUM. L. REV. 529, 531 (2008).
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Constitution, or draw on a pragmatic method that turns on the conse-
quences for how constitutional provisions are applied.  In other cir-
cumstances, jurists stand by well-established constitutional
precedents and understandings.
Originalism is a modality of constitutional interpretation that is
often congruent with an entity conception of law (in particular, the
moderate varieties described below).229  Originalism purports to inter-
pret the meaning of the Constitution’s broad contours as fixed, static,
and unchanging: “[t]he Constitution is a written instrument.  As such
its meaning does not alter.  That which it meant when adopted, it
means now.”230  Proponents advance this technique of constitutional
interpretation on the theory that it constrains judicial discretion and
results in a fixed and determinate form of constitutional interpreta-
tion across time.231  Under this modality, a jurist finds a right to exist
in the Constitution only if that right is expressly provided in the Con-
stitution or was intended by the Constitution’s framers or ratifiers.
This modality presumes that amending the Constitution is the only
legitimate means for altering constitutional understandings.
Yet Originalism cannot describe many vistas of constitutional law
and would result in tectonic shifts in constitutional law if pressed into
these well-settled areas.  To name a few, Originalism would abrogate
the protection against sex discrimination under the Equal Protection
Clause,232 application of the Equal Protection Clause to the federal
government, application of the Equal Protection Clause to segregation
in public schools,233 and expansion of the Commerce Clause to permit
the federal government to regulate much commercial activity.234
In contrast, non-Originalism represents several diverse modalities
of constitutional interpretation that are congruent with an incremen-
229. SCALIA, supra note 149, at 3, 38.  For a history of Originalism, see John Harrison,
Forms of Originalism and the Study of History, 26 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 83,
83–86 (2003); Larry Kramer, Two (More) Problems with Originalism, 31 HARV.
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 907, 908 (2008) (“The idea of originalism as an exclusive theory,
as the criterion for measuring constitutional decisions, emerged only in the
1970’s and 1980’s.”); JOHNATHAN O’NEILL, ORIGINALISM IN AMERICAN LAW AND
POLITICS: A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 94–110 (2005).
230. South Carolina v. United States, 199 U.S. 437, 448 (1905).
231. See SCALIA, supra note 149, at 3, 38.
232. Compare The Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36 (1872) (holding that the equal
protection clause was designed to protect only racial minorities), with Reed v.
Reed, 404 U.S. 71 (1971) (applying equal protection clause to invalidate gender
discrimination).
233. While the Congress that ratified the Fourteenth Amendment approved segrega-
tion in District of Columbia schools, see RONALD DWORKIN, LAW’S EMPIRE 360
(1986), segregation in schools is of course now illegal and unconstitutional. See
Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
234. See Michael W. McConnell, Active Liberty: A Progressive Alternative to Textual-
ism and Originalism?, 119 HARV. L. REV. 2387, 2417 (2006).
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tal conception of law.235  These incremental techniques view Ameri-
can constitutional law as changing, dynamic, and as evolving to
address current conditions and new problems: “[i]t is no answer to say
that this public need was not apprehended a century ago, or to insist
that what the provision of the Constitution meant to the vision of that
day it must mean to the vision of our time.”236  These incremental
modes view any decipherable original understanding as a hypothesis
for understanding the Constitution, but one that must be tested in
light of new experience.  In characterizing non-Originalism ap-
proaches as incremental, I am primarily referring to the tradition of
redemptive constitutionalism,237 the common law method of constitu-
tional interpretation,238 and the pragmatic methods of constitutional
decision-making articulated by Justice Breyer239 and Judge Pos-
ner,240 though as recently articulated Professor Balkin’s theory of
framework Originalism, which allows for living constitutionalism also
connects with an incremental mindset of the Constitution.241  A ra-
tional minimalist approach to constitutional jurisprudence is consis-
tent to an incremental conception of the law, in so far as the approach
unfolds deliberately and slowly from prior precedents, while making
room for subtle shifts and social evolution.242
The critical point is that American society influences the degree to
which jurists select between entity and incremental modalities of con-
stitutional law.243  As Sunstein has argued, “constitutional change
has occurred through the judgments of many minds and succeeding
generations . . .”244  When an entity (status quo) theory of society is
235. I place to one side the morality-based modality urged by Ronald Dworkin. See
Ronald Dworkin, Introduction: The Moral Reading and the Majoritarian Premise
in FREEDOM’S LAW: THE MORAL READING OF THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTION 2–4,
7–11 (Cambridge: Harvard Univ. Press 1997).
236. Home Building and Loan Ass’n v. Blaisdell, 290 U.S. 398 (1934).
237. See Jack M. Balkin & Reva B. Siegel, Introduction in THE CONSTITUTION IN 2020
1–7 (Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
238. See David A. Strauss, Common Law, Common Ground, and Jefferson’s Principle,
112 YALE L.J. 1717 (2003); David A. Strauss, Common Law Constitutional Inter-
pretation, 63 U. CHI. L. REV. 877 (1996).
239. See STEPHEN BREYER, ACTIVE LIBERTY: INTERPRETING OUR DEMOCRATIC CONSTITU-
TION (2005).
240. See Richard A. Posner, Pragmatic Adjudication, 18 CARDOZO L. REV. 1 (1996).
241. See Jack Balkin, Framework Originalism and the Living Constitution, 103 NW. L.
REV. 549 (2009).
242. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON THE
SUPREME COURT 3–4 (1998) (“Let us describe the phenomenon of saying no more
than necessary to justify an outcome, and leaving as much as possible undecided,
as “decisional minimalism.”).
243. Cf. BARRY FRIEDMAN, THE WILL OF THE PEOPLE, HOW PUBLIC OPINION HAS INFLU-
ENCED THE SUPREME COURT AND SHAPED THE MEANING OF THE CONSTITUTION
14–18 (2009); Robin West, Constitutional Culture or Ordinary Politics: A Reply to
Reva Siegel, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1465, 1473 (2006).
244. SUNSTEIN, supra note 225, at 3.
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salient in mind, jurists would likely believe American society has not
changed on a particular issue—its constitutional understandings,
practices, norms, institutions, social arrangements, and ways of be-
having.  A jurist with an entity (status quo) theory of society would
likely draw on a congruent modality of constitutional law that is
static.  With an entity (status quo) mindset, a jurist may tend to draw
on well-settled precedent or moderate versions of Originalism that do
not alter constitutional understandings.245  In contrast, when an in-
cremental mindset is salient in mind, jurists would likely believe
American society has transformed on a particular issue—that the
American public has markedly changed its practices, norms, institu-
tions, social arrangements, and ways of behaving—or that conditions
of American government have markedly changed.  A jurist with an in-
cremental theory would draw on a congruent mode of constitutional
interpretation that is dynamic.  This technique would be sufficiently
flexible to accommodate the transformations in American society.
With an incremental mindset, jurists may draw on non-Originalism
techniques of constitutional interpretation.
Of course, some constitutional issues are politically and atti-
tudinally charged, and for some jurists, political ideology may well en-
gulf the field of perception and cognition,246 including the
determination of what counts as a well-settled constitutional under-
standing and whether American society has changed practices or con-
stitutional understandings on a particular issue.  I have articulated
this social psychological account of the ways in which implicit theories
of society may interact with judicial interpretation as a hypothesis to
be tested and refined.  Inquiry will be directed toward evaluating the
conditions under which implicit theories influence the selection of con-
gruent modalities of constitutional interpretation.  I offer this social
psychological bridge between society and constitutional modalities as
descriptive theory to be experimentally examined, rather than as a
prescriptive theory.247
245. See Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonoriginalists, 45 LOY. L. REV. 611,
620 (1999); Antonin Scalia, Originalism: The Lesser Evil, 57 U. CIN. L. REV. 849,
864 (1989) (“[I]n a crunch I may prove a faint-hearted originalist.”).
246. See Dan M. Kahan, The Supreme Court, 2010 Term—Foreword: Neutral Princi-
ples, Motivated Cognition, and Some Problems for Constitutional Law, 125 HARV.
L. REV. 1, 18–25 (2011).
247. Vicki C. Jackson, Democracy and Judicial Review, Will and Reason, Amendment
and Interpretation: A Review of Barry Friedman’s The Will of the People, 13 U.
PA. J. CONST. L. 413 (2010).  For another day, I leave the normative implications
of social psychological research on situated cognition and implicit theories. See
generally ROBIN WEST, NORMATIVE JURISPRUDENCE AN INTRODUCTION (Cambridge
Univ. Press 2011).
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IV. STUDYING THE SOCIAL DIMENSION OF
JUDICIAL DECISION-MAKING
We return where we began, “[t]he felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy,
avowed or unconscious, even the prejudices which judges share with
their fellow-men, have had a good deal more to do than the syllogism
in determining the rules by which men should be governed.”248  The
experimental psychology I have introduced suggests that implicit the-
ories about the static versus dynamic aspects of human nature, social
arrangements, and society are part and parcel of the psychological
process that Justice Holmes described—shaping the deep, often un-
conscious, presuppositions and expectations that jurists bring to legal
decisions.  These implicit theories likely shape how judges find facts in
particular disputes, shape the inferences judges draw, and the punish-
ment judges impose.  These implicit theories likely also shape how ju-
rists approach novel questions under the common law, statutes, and
the Constitution, especially when jurists perceive that American soci-
ety and its social arrangements have transformed.
This Article has elaborated why the social psychological research
on implicit theories is pivotal for understanding judicial behavior.  I
have outlined a perspective that focuses on the social psychological
and situational dimensions of judicial behavior, one connecting judg-
ing with society and perceptions of change in society.  In doing so, I
have introduced science on how social, contextual, and situational
forces likely influence judicial decision-making, and discussed the the-
ory of situated cognition.249
The degree to which implicit theories affect judicial behavior is an
empirical question, one warranting experimental research.  These
subtle psychological processes would be difficult to investigate using
traditional methods of empirical legal research, which apply statisti-
cal methods to evaluate federal case law coded for a variety of factors.
For example, recent empirical legal studies on how public opinion
shapes judicial behavior have lamented the difficulty of identifying a
causal mechanism in the relation between changes in public opinion
and changes in patterns of judicial behavior.250
A fruitful line of inquiry will be psychological experiments.  Re-
search on implicit theories has shown that many of the judgments and
reactions related to implicit theories can be experimentally induced by
manipulating participants’ implicit theories.251  Psychological experi-
ments would, therefore, allow scholars to draw causal inferences and
248. HOLMES, supra note 6, at 1.
249. See Smith, supra note 9, at 126–127.
250. See, e.g., Lee Epstein & Andrew Martin, supra note 15.
251. See, e.g., Murphy & Dweck, supra note 25, at 284.
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observe, with relatively little difficulty, whether or not the indepen-
dent variable caused changes in the dependent variable.  With other
designs, however, the causal relation and psychological mechanism
cannot be easily determined.  Through random assignment to condi-
tion and controlled manipulations of independent variables, experi-
ments provide unambiguous inferences about causality, thus the
outcomes of experiments are essential to consider when exploring the
underlying mechanisms by which jurists make decisions.252
In conclusion, by investigating the social and situational dimen-
sion of judicial decision-making, we hope one day to understand the
processes by which American society comes to shape law by accultur-
ating legal actors.  This research may one day broaden and deepen our
understanding of how American law can seem at once both static and
dynamic.
252. See ABRAHAM KAPLAN, THE CONDUCT OF INQUIRY—METHODOLOGY FOR BEHAV-
IORAL SCIENCE 26–70 (Transaction Pub. 2004); CHAVA FRANKFORT-NACHMIAS, ET
AL., RESEARCH METHODS IN THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 92–93 (Worth Pub. 6th ed.
2000).
